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Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of
reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic,
such that the dynamics becomes deterministic only in infinitely large populations. Here, we intro-
duce a new microscopic birth–death process that has a fully deterministic strong selection limit in
well–mixed populations of any size. Additionally, under weak selection, from this new process the
frequency dependent Moran process is recovered. This makes it a natural extension of the usual
evolutionary dynamics under weak selection. We analytically find simple expressions for the fix-
ation probabilities and average fixation times of the new process in evolutionary games with two
players and two strategies. For cyclic games with two players and three strategies, we show that the
resulting deterministic dynamics crucially depends on the initial condition in a non–trivial way.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game dynamics results from the transfer
of economic ideas to biology [1–4]. In economics, ra-
tional players try to find the best strategy to maximize
their payoffs. In biology, those individuals who use the
best strategy obtain the highest reproductive fitness and
spread in the population.
Traditionally, evolutionary game dynamics is consid-
ered in infinitely large, well–mixed populations. This
typically leads to the replicator dynamics, a system of
nonlinear differential equations governing the evolution-
ary dynamics [5–8]. For any composition of the popu-
lation, the replicator dynamics determines deterministi-
cally the direction and velocity of evolutionary dynamics.
The replicator dynamics can be derived from microscopic
models of strategy spreading, which are typically stochas-
tic [9–13]. The precise definition of strategy spreading be-
tween individuals can have decisive consequences for the
dynamics, in particular in structured populations [14–
21].
Since microscopic models of strategy spreading are typ-
ically stochastic, evolutionary game dynamics in finite
populations can only be characterized in a probabilistic
way. The most important quantities are the probability
that a mutant takes over a population and the average
time for this process [22–25]. Different models for strat-
egy spreading have been proposed. A popular model is
to choose two players, Harry and Sally, at random and to
let Harry adopt the strategy of Sally with a probability
given by the Fermi function, (1 + exp[−β(piH − piS)])−1,
where piH is the payoff of Harry and piS is the payoff of
Sally [26–29]. The parameter β measures the intensity
of selection. For β  1, selection is weak and strategy
spreading is essentially random. For β  1, selection is
strong and only strategies that are more successful will
be imitated. For β →∞, the direction of the process for
two strategies becomes deterministic and thus the fixa-
tion probability is either 0 or 1. However, even in this
case, the process is only semi-deterministic, as the time
of fixation remains stochastic [29].
Here, we introduce a variant of the Moran process
which leads to a fully deterministic evolutionary process
in finite populations under strong selection. For weak
selection, we essentially recover the transition probabili-
ties of the standard frequency dependent Moran process
under weak selection.
We describe evolutionary game dynamics in symmetric
2× 2 games defined by the general payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (1)
An A player will obtain a when playing against another
A or b when playing against B. Choosing strategy B
results in either obtaining c (against A) or d (against B).
The average payoffs are obtained from pairwise inter-
actions with all other individuals in the population of
size N . This is the standard assumption and refers to
the fact that the population is well–mixed, i. e. there is
no explicit population structure. Excluding self interac-
tions, this leads to
piAi =
i− 1
N − 1 a+
N − i
N − 1 b (2)
piBi =
i
N − 1 c+
N − i− 1
N − 1 d, (3)
where i is the current number of A players in the pop-
ulation. Individuals with higher average payoffs pro-
duce offspring (or are imitated) with a higher probability.
Thus, reproductive success is based on the payoff from
the game. The intensity of selection β controls the im-
portance of success in the game for reproductive success.
The larger the intensity of selection, the stronger the in-
fluence of the average payoff difference on reproductive
fitness.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Sec-
tion II we introduce the birth–death process as a general
framework of evolutionary dynamics between two types
in finite, well–mixed populations. In particular, we ad-
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dress the probability and times of absorption. In Sec-
tion III we give three explicit analytical forms for the
microscopic dynamics and we discuss the possibility to
analyze strong selection in each case. We show that the
standard Moran process and a previous generalization
do not allow a fully deterministic strong selection limit
and propose a new generalization of the Moran process
with selection at birth as well as selection at death. In
Section IV we perform the strong selection limit analyt-
ically for the new process. In Section V we consider the
process with selection at birth and death for two player
games with three strategies, namely the the Rock–Paper–
Scissors game. Finally, in Section VI we conclude and
discuss our findings.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS IN
FINITE POPULATIONS
In this section, we recall some important properties of
stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite popula-
tions. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to birth–death
processes in which the number of A players can change
at most by ±1 in each update step.
Let i be the number of A individuals players in a pop-
ulation of size N > 2. The number of B players is given
by N − i. The transition probabilities to move from i
to i + 1 and to i − 1 are denoted by T+i (β) and T−i (β),
respectively. The probability to stay in the current state
is thus 1−T+i (β)−T−i (β). These microscopic details do
not have to be specified further at this point. The only
requirement is that the expressions for T±i (β) 6= 0 are
analytic in system size, payoffs and intensity of selection.
It is also assumed that the population size remains con-
stant. Mutations are excluded, such that a strategy that
is lost will not re-appear in the system.
In the continuous limit N → ∞, the state of the sys-
tem x = i/N becomes a continuous variable, strategy A
can have any abundance and we recover a deterministic
differential equation [9–13]. This allows to compute the
fixed points of the system. There are always fixed points
at x = 0 and x = 1. In addition, there can be a third
fixed point at x∗ = (d − b)/(a − b − c + d), which is un-
stable when a > c and b < d and stable when a < c and
b > d.
In finite population models, stochasticity does not al-
low the definition of fixed points. However, the bound-
aries i = 0 and i = N are absorbing due to the ab-
sence of mutations, T+0 (β) = 0 and T
−
N (β) = 0. For
recurrent Markov chains (T±i (β) > 0 for 0 < i < N),
the system will eventually be absorbed at the bound-
aries. The probability φAi (β) that a given number of i
A players will reach the absorbing boundary at N is an
important quantity to describe the process. In addition
to this fixation probability, the unconditional and con-
ditional fixation times, ti(β) and t
A
i (β), characterize the
stochastic process [24, 30–32]. These two average times
are the expectation values of the number of time steps it
needs either to reach any homogenous state (all A or all
B) or to reach fixation at all A under the condition that
this event occurs. In the following we recall recursions
for these three quantities which can be solved regardless
of the details of the birth–death process. Each solution
is only based on the microscopic transition probabilities
T±i (β).
A. Fixation probability
The probability of fixation φAi (β) describes the prob-
ability that a given number i of new A mutants in a
population of B will reach fixation at all A. Since the
homogenous states are absorbing, we have φA0 (β) = 0 as
well as φAN (β) = 1. For all the intermediate states we can
write a balance equation for the probability to fixate at
all A (i = N),
0 = T−i (β)
(
φAi−1(β)− φAi (β)
)
+ T+i (β)
(
φAi+1(β)− φAi (β)
)
.
(4)
With the boundary conditions φA0 (β) = 0 and φ
A
N (β) = 1,
this can be solved recursively [4, 24]. We obtain
φAi (β) =
1 +
∑i−1
k=1
∏k
m=1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
m=1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
. (5)
The probability to fixate at the pure state all B starting
from i A individuals is given by φBi (β) = 1− φAi (β).
B. Unconditional average fixation time
The average time (measured in elementary time steps)
it needs to reach fixation at one of the homogenous states
(i = 0 or i = N) starting with i players of type A is
denoted by ti(β). Obviously, t0(β) = 0 and tN (β) =
0. The unconditional fixation times also fulfill a balance
equation with the transition probabilities describing the
rate of change,
ti(β) = 1 + T
−
i (β) ti−1(β)
+
(
1− T+i (β)− T−i (β)
)
ti(β)
+ T+i (β) ti+1(β). (6)
This is a recursion equation for the unconditional mean
exit times or average times of fixation. Its solution for
the unconditional average fixation time reads [32, 33]
ti(β) =
N−1∑
k=i
k∑
l=1
1
T+l (β)
k∏
m=l+1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
− t1(β)
N−1∑
k=i
k∏
m=1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
, (7)
t1(β) =φ
A
1 (β)
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
T+l (β)
k∏
m=l+1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
. (8)
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Next, we address the time it takes to reach a particular
absorbing state.
C. Conditional average fixation time
Under the condition that the process reaches the ab-
sorbing state at all A, i = N , the average time of fixation
starting from i, is tAi (β). Following [24], we start from
the recursion
φAi (β) t
A
i (β) = T
−
i (β)φ
A
i−1(β)(t
A
i−1(β) + 1)
+
(
1− T+i (β)− T−i (β)
)
φAi (β)(t
A
i (β) + 1)
+ T+i (β)φ
A
i+1(β)(t
A
i+1(β) + 1). (9)
The conditional average fixation time is conditioned upon
fixation at all A, which occurs with probability φAi (β).
Thus, the product of probability and conditional time of
fixation appears in the recursion. There can be a finite
expectation value even for vanishing fixation probability,
because φAi (β)t
A
i (β)→ 0 does not imply tAi (β)→ 0. For
the average fixation time under the condition of absorp-
tion at all A we find [24, 32, 34, 35],
tAi (β) =
1
φAi (β)
N−1∑
k=i
k∑
l=1
φAl (β)
T+l (β)
k∏
m=l+1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
− tA1 (β)
φA1 (β)
φAi (β)
N−1∑
k=i
k∏
m=1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
, (10)
tA1 (β) =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
φAl (β)
T+l (β)
k∏
m=l+1
T−m(β)
T+m(β)
. (11)
There is an analogous expression for the fixation time
under the condition that strategy B gets fixed in the
population, tBi (β), [32].
As the expressions (5), (7) and (10) are functions of
the T±i (β), the study of a strong selection limit has to
be performed in the transition probabilities. In the next
section, we introduce a process with the analytical strong
selection limit T+i (β → ∞) → 1 and T−i (β → ∞) → 0
(or the other way around), and we show that the resulting
dynamics is fully deterministic in this limit.
III. THE MORAN PROCESS
A. Selection at birth and random death
A standard model for evolutionary dynamics in finite
populations is the frequency dependent Moran process
[22]. This process incorporates the following steps: An
individual is selected at random, but proportional to
its fitness. This individual produces identical offspring.
The offspring replaces an individual randomly selected
for death. Fitness f is a convex combination of the av-
erage payoffs from the game, piAi and pi
B
i , and a back-
ground fitness, which is usually set to one. Thus, we
have fAi (β) = 1 − β + β piAi and fBi (β) = 1 − β + β piBi .
The quantity 0 ≤ β ≤ βmax determines the intensity of
selection. The transition probabilities of the Moran pro-
cess are thus given by
T+i (β) =
i fAi (β)
ifAi (β) + (N − i)fBi (β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at birth
× N − i
N
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random death
(12a)
T−i (β) =
(N − i)fBi (β)
ifAi (β) + (N − i)fBi (β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at birth
× i
N
.︸︷︷︸
Random death
(12b)
Selecting proportional to fitness implies that fitness is
positive. Thus, for payoff matrices with negative entries,
the intensity of selection β cannot exceed a threshold
βmax. This process does not have a generic determinis-
tic limit with arbitrarily strong selection intensity and
remains stochastic with random death.
A possibility to extend the Moran process to higher
intensities of selection is to choose fitness as an exponen-
tial function of the payoff, i.e. fAi (β) = exp(+β pi
A
i ) and
fBi (β) = exp(+β pi
B
i ) [36, 37]. Now, the intensity of se-
lection β can be any positive number. For β → ∞, the
fitter individual is always selected for reproduction, com-
pare equations (12a) and (12b). The direction of the pro-
cess becomes deterministic. But due to random death,
the system can remain longer or shorter in a particu-
lar state. Thus, the process remains stochastic in what
concerns the times to fixation. With two strategies, we
have a semi deterministic process with deterministic di-
rection and stochastic speed [29]. If there are more than
two strategies, random death can also change the com-
position of the less fit types in the population. This can
affect the direction of selection, as the fittest type can
change due to frequency dependent selection.
B. Selection at birth and death
Here, we introduce a birth–death process that recov-
ers the usual results for weak selection, but also leads to
fully deterministic asymptotic behavior for strong selec-
tion. The process has deterministic microscopic dynam-
ics if the T±i (β) are zero or one. As in the standard Moran
process, we assume that selection at birth is proportional
to fitness. In addition to producing less offspring, individ-
uals with a lower fitness now have a higher probability to
die. A simple way to incorporate this is to select at death
proportional to inverse fitness. To ensure that fitness is a
positive number, we follow the approach discussed above
and define fitness as an exponential function of the pay-
3
off. This leads to the transition probabilities
T+i (β) =
ie+βb pi
A
i
ie+βbpi
A
i + (N − i)e+βb piBi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at birth
× (N − i)e
−βd piBi
ie−βd piAi + (N − i)e−βd piBi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at death
, (13a)
T−i (β) =
(N − i)e+βb piBi
ie+βb pi
A
i + (N − i)e+βb piBi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at birth
× ie
−βd piAi
ie−βd piAi + (N − i)e−βd piBi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection at death
. (13b)
βb is the intensity of selection at birth and βd is the in-
tensity of selection at death. For βd = 0, we recover the
process discussed in Section III. It is known that under
weak selection many birth–death processes have the same
general properties [25, 38, 39]. Especially, for βb,d  1
the behavior of the Moran process is recovered [29, 30].
For simplicity, we assume β = βb = βd in the following.
The transition probabilities can be written as
T+i (β) =
i
i+ (N − i)e−β∆pii
N − i
i e−β∆pii +N − i , (14a)
T−i (β) =
N − i
i e+β∆pii +N − i
i
i+ (N − i)e+β∆pii . (14b)
Thus, as far as the payoffs are concerned, the transition
probabilities only depend on the difference between the
frequency dependent average payoffs, ∆pii = pi
A
i − piBi .
The case of ∆pii = 0 is a form of neutral selection.
In this case, the transition probabilities are T±i (β) ≡
(N − i)/N2, for arbitrary β. Note that for neutral se-
lection, moving into one direction is equally probable as
moving into the other T+i (0) = T
−
i (0). But the prob-
ability to leave a given interior state changes with i,
T±i (0) 6= T±j (0) for i 6= j.
For arbitrary β, the ratio of the transition probabili-
ties reduces to an exponential function of the payoff dif-
ference,
T−i (β)
T+i (β)
= e−2β∆pii . (15)
Hence, the fixation probabilities of the process can be
approximated with the closed expressions derived in [28],
after rescaling the intensity of selection by a factor of
2. From this, it is clear that the usual weak selection
behavior is recovered.
IV. STRONG SELECTION
For strong selection, β →∞, the asymptotic behavior
of the transition probabilities depends only on the sign
of the payoff difference. We focus on the generic cases
∆pii ≶ 0 to discuss this limit. The limiting cases can be
obtained from equations (14a) and (14b) and yield
lim
β→∞
T+i (β) =
 0 for ∆pii < 01 for ∆pii > 0 , (16)
as well as
lim
β→∞
T−i (β) =
 1 for ∆pii < 00 for ∆pii > 0 . (17)
Since limβ→∞(T+i (β) + T
−
i (β)) = 1, the probability to
stay in the state i (0 < i < N) vanishes for β → ∞ and
nontrivial payoff difference, ∆pii 6= 0. Thus, we have a
fully deterministic process for arbitrary population size.
With this, we consider the fixation probability φAi (β) and
average fixation times ti(β) and t
A
i (β) in the limiting case
of strong selection. In the following let φAi (∞) as well as
ti(∞) and tAi (∞) denote the finite asymptotic (β →∞)
values of the fixation probability and times. We identify
them in terms of the initial frequency i, depending on
the average payoff difference for the process introduced
above under strong selection.
A. Fixation Probability
Starting with equation (4) and inserting the limiting
cases of T±i (β) leads to
φAi (∞) =
(
lim
β→∞
T−i (β)
)
φAi−1(∞)
+
(
lim
β→∞
T+i (β)
)
φAi+1(∞). (18)
That is, in the strong selection limit we have a very simple
recursion for the asymptotic value of the fixation prob-
ability, depending on the sign of the payoff difference
∆pii. When strategy A dominates strategy B (a > c and
b > d), we have ∆pii > 0. For 0 < i < N , this yields
limβ→∞ T−i (β) = 0, and limβ→∞ T
+
i (β) = 1, which re-
sults in φAi (∞) = 1−δ0,i. In other words, the probability
to reach the state with all B individuals is zero, except
if there are no A individuals initially. Equivalently, for
dominance of strategy B we obtain φAi (∞) = δN,i. More
interesting cases are found when ∆pii changes its sign,
which occurs at i∗ = (N(d − b) + a − d)/(a − b − c + d)
when a > c and d > b or when a < c and d < b. These
are two important classes of games: coordination games
and coexistence games.
Let us first focus on coordination games (a > c and
d > b). In these games, the threshold value i∗ cannot
be crossed for infinitely large systems with determinis-
tic dynamics [40]. For finite systems under strong selec-
tion, we observe something similar. The payoff difference
∆pii changes sign from negative to positive and selection
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points always away from i∗ toward the boundaries. De-
pending on the initial condition i ≷ i∗, the fixation prob-
ability φAi (∞) is one or zero.
(i) If i < i∗, ∆pii is negative and with Eqs. (16)
and (17) we have φAi (∞) = φAi−1(∞). We start
the recursion for the fixation probabilities with
φA1 (∞) = φA0 (∞) = 0. This yields φAi<i∗(∞) = 0.
(ii) For i > i∗, ∆pii is positive and Eqs. (16) and
(17) yield the recursion φAi (∞) = φAi+1(∞). Start-
ing with the maximal i we obtain φAN−1(∞) =
φAN (∞) = 1 and thus φAi>i∗(∞) = 1.
(iii) If i∗ happens to be an integer value and the system
starts there, the first step has equal probabilities,
T+i∗ (β) = T
−
i∗ (β) =
1
2 . This leads to φ
A
i∗(∞) = 12 .
In summary, for the fixation probability we find
φAi (∞) =

0 for i < i∗
1
2 for i = i
∗
1 for i > i∗
. (19)
This is clearly what is to be expected because A is se-
lected for i > i∗ and B is selected for i < i∗, FIG. 1.
Dominance of strategy A can be seen as a special case of
coexistence with i∗ < 0.
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FIG. 1: The fixation probability as a function of selection
intensity for a coordination game (a > c, b < d), given by
Eq. (5), with selection at birth and death, Eqs. (14a) and
(14b). From the payoff matrix given in the figure, we obtain
i∗ = 17
22
+ 5
11
N , which gives i∗ ≈ 5.32 for our numerical exam-
ple with N = 10. With increasing selection intensity β, for
any l < i∗ we have φAl (β) → 0 (straight lines), whereas for
any m > i∗ we have φAm(β) → 1 (dotted lines). The φAi (β)
for each i can be identified via its neutral value φAi (0) =
i
N
.
Next, we consider coexistence games with a < c and
d < b. In this case, ∆pii changes sign from positive to neg-
ative and selection points always away from the bound-
aries toward i∗. For strong selection, the system gets
trapped and fixation never occurs.
(i) If i∗ is an integer, the system switches from i∗ to
i∗±1 with equal probability. From i∗±1, it always
returns to i∗.
(ii) If i∗ is not an integer, we observe deterministic
flipping between the two neighboring states states
i1 < i
∗, i2 > i∗.
Since fixation never occurs in coexistence games, it does
not make sense to compute the asymptotic value of the
fixation probability. Formally, the probability to get ab-
sorbed in all A converges to 1 if i∗ > N/2 and to 0
otherwise. However, it turns out that the fixation times
diverge.
B. Unconditional average fixation time
The average time it takes for i A players to either be-
come extinct or take over the population, ti(β), can be
found by solving equation (6) recursively. To examine
the limit of strong selection, we perform the limit on
both sides of the balance equation, assuming that there
exists an asymptotic value ti(∞) of the unconditional fix-
ation time. With the previous analysis of the transition
probabilities, this leads to
ti(∞) = 1 +
(
lim
β→∞
T−i (β)
)
ti−1(∞)
+
(
lim
β→∞
T+i (β)
)
ti+1(∞). (20)
This strong selection recursion has to be analyzed for
the two different cases of behavior at the threshold i∗,
coordination and coexistence. Again, we first examine
the coordination game (a > c and d > b).
(i) For i < i∗, the payoff difference is negative, ∆pii <
0. The recursion amounts to ti(∞) = 1 + ti−1(∞),
because T+(i) → 0 whereas T−i (β) → 1. With
t0(∞) = 0 at the boundary we have t1(∞) = 1,
t2(∞) = 1 + t1(∞) = 2, and eventually ti(∞) = i.
(ii) For i > i∗ the payoff difference is ∆pii > 0. The
recursion from (20) is ti(∞) = 1 + ti+1(∞). The
transition probabilities T±(i) behave exactly in the
opposite way as before. The time starting from
next to the absorbing boundary is tN−1(∞) = 1 +
tN (∞) = 1. Hence, we have tN−k(∞) = k, or
with k = N − i, the uncondtional averag time is
ti(∞) = N − i.
(iii) If the threshold is an integer and the system is ini-
tiated there the number of steps needed to fixate
is i∗ or N − i∗ with equal probability. Thus, we
can compute the average time with the previous
findings, ti∗(∞) = 1/2(i∗ +N − i∗) = N/2.
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In summary, depending on the the starting point i∗, the
asymptotic value for the unconditional average fixation
time in a coordination game is
ti(∞) =

i for i < i∗,
N
2 for i = i
∗,
N − i for i > i∗.
(21)
In the strong selection limit ti(∞) converges to the dis-
tance between initial state and the final state, as expected
from deterministic motion.
We can also infer the dynamics for games in which one
strategy dominates. When strategy A dominates, we can
formally set i∗ < 0 and obtain ti(∞) = N − i, cf. FIG. 2.
When strategy B dominates, the equivalent procedure
yields ti(∞) = i.
In case of a coexistence game, the system gets trapped
around i∗ and cannot reach the absorbing boundaries.
As expected, the recursions lead to ti(∞)→∞.
 0
 0.0015
0.0030
 1  500  1000  1500  2000
 0
 0.05
0.10
 0.15
 99  150  200
β = 1
β = 2
β = 10
β = 20
t1(β)
P
(t
1
(β
))
FIG. 2: Probability distribution of the unconditional fixation
time (measured in elementary time steps) of a single A player
in a population of N −1 dominated B players. For β = 1 and
β = 2, the distribution has two peaks corresponding to the
two absorbing boundaries. For stronger selection (inset), the
probability that the advantageous A individual goes extinct
becomes small and fixation takes at least N−1 time steps. In
this case, the distribution becomes single peaked. For β →∞,
the distribution converges to a delta peak at t1(∞) = N − 1
(payoff matrix a = 2.2, b = 1.5, c = 2, d = 0.5, population size
N = 100, histograms obtained from 107 realizations. Lines
are guides to the eye).
C. Conditional average fixation time
If i A players take over the population, the asymp-
totic fixation time under this condition, tAi (∞), can be
obtained by solving the balance equation (9) recursively.
However, this situation is more complex as we have to
consider the fixation probability and the conditional fixa-
tion time in a combined way. Introducing the asymptotic
value θAi (∞) = φAi (∞) tAi (∞), the recursion (9) yields
θAi (∞) =
(
lim
β→∞
T−i (β)
)
(θAi−1(∞) + φAi−1(∞))
+
(
lim
β→∞
T+i (β)
)
(θAi+1(∞) + φAi+1(∞)). (22)
The formulation of a similar equation for θBi (∞) =(
1− φAi (∞)
)
tBi (∞) is straightforward. Both are ana-
lyzed regarding the different behavior at either side of
the threshold i∗.
For the coordination game the system reaches the ab-
sorbing boundaries after a finite time.
(i) If i > i∗, the system fixates at i = N with proba-
bility φAi (∞) = 1. Thus, θAi (∞) = tAi (∞) and we
recover the same recursion as for the unconditional
fixation time. This yields tAi (∞) = ti(∞) = N − i,
see FIG. 3.
(ii) If i < i∗, the system fixates at i = 0, φAi (∞) = 0.
Thus, we cannot formulate a meaningful recursion
for tAi (∞). In this case we observe T−i (β) → 1,
T+i (β) → 0 and we can only make a statement for
tBi (∞), which results in tBi (β) = i.
(iii) If i = i∗ is an integer, the system is not fully de-
terministic as fixation of A and fixation of B are
observed with equal probability 12 . In this case, we
obtain tAi∗(∞) = N − i∗ and tBi∗(∞) = i∗.
In a regime where A always performs better than B the
unconditional fixation time tAi (∞) is equal to the condi-
tional fixation time ti(∞), see FIG. 3. Equivalently, when
B always performs better, we have tBi (∞) = ti(∞).
For a coexistence game, the system does not reach any
of the boundaries but is always dragged toward i∗, as
discussed before. The recursion (22) for tAi (∞) or its
equivalent for tBi (∞) are not meaningful here because
they contain the fixation probabilities. However, in this
case all fixation times diverge with β.
In this section, we have derived asymptotic values for
the birth–death process with selection at birth and selec-
tion at death. We have identified the underlying games
that lead to a fully deterministic process in the limit of
strong selection. As we have seen, the difference of the
average payoffs ∆pii as a function of the the relative abun-
dance of type A plays an important role.
V. GAMES WITH THREE STRATEGIES
Here, we demonstrate that the process we have intro-
duced above leads to rather simple and often determin-
istic dynamics. We focus on games with two players and
three strategies with cyclic dominance [41–50]. Cyclic
dominance among three strategies corresponds to Rock–
Paper–Scissors games, where each strategy can be beaten
6
 0
 50
 100
 0  1  2
 0
 30
 60
 0  1  2
( A B
A 3.2 0.5
B 2.0 1.5
)
( A B
A 3.2 1.5
B 2.0 0.5
)
Selection intensity β
Selection intensity β
Av
er
ag
e
fix
at
io
n
tim
e
Av
er
ag
e
fix
at
io
n
tim
e
t1(β)
tA1 (β)
t6(β)
tA6 (β)
t9(β)
tA9 (β)
t9(β)
tA9 (β)
FIG. 3: Unconditional (red) and conditional (black) aver-
age fixation times (measured in elementary time steps) as a
function of the intensity of selection for a coordination game
(top) and a game in which A dominates (bottom). The payoff
matrices of the games are given in the figures, the population
size is N = 10. Top: In a coordination game (a > c, b < d),
the conditional and unconditional fixation times, ti(β) and
tAi (β) converge to N − i for β → ∞ if initially more than
i∗ = 117/22 ≈ 5.32 individuals play A, compare Eq. (21).
The lines show the initials states i = 6 (dotted lines) and
i = 9 (full lines). Bottom: When A dominates B (a > c,
b > d), the unconditional fixation time t1(β) first increases
with β. For any initial condition i, ti(β) and t
A
i (β) converge
to N − i in the limit of strong selection. The initials states
are i = 1 (dotted lines) and i = 9 (straight lines).
by another one: Rock crushes Scissors, Scissors cut Paper
and Paper wraps rock. In general, the payoff for winning
does not have to be equal to the payoff for losing, which
leads to non–zero–sum games. For simplicity, we set the
payoff for a tie to zero. Setting the winners payoff to one
and the losers payoff to −s ≤ 0, the 3× 3 payoff matrix
reads

R P S
R 0 −s 1
P 1 0 −s
S −s 1 0
. (23)
For infinite populations, the state of the system is de-
fined by the frequencies of the three strategies, xR, xP ,
and xS . Thus, the state space is the simplex S3 ⊂ R2,
an equilateral triangle between the three states all R, all
P , and all S. Apart from the three trivial equilibria,
the replicator dynamics has an interior equilibrium at
(xR, xP , xS)
∗ = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ), which follows from the symme-
try of the system. The quantity s determines wether the
interior equilibrium is asymptotically stable (the system
spirals inwards towards the interior fixed point for s < 1)
or unstable (the system spirals out toward a heteroclinic
cycle along the boundaries for s > 1). In the zero–sum
game with s = 1, the system oscillates around the inte-
rior equilibrium with the Hamiltonian −xRxPxS being a
constant of motion [4, 8]. In finite, well–mixed popula-
s = 1
N = 33
s = 1
N = 11
s < 1
N = 33
s > 1
N = 33
FIG. 4: The discrete simplex of the Rock–Paper–Scissors
game for the different ranges of s. The three strategies are
arranged in such a way that cyclic dominance is counter clock-
wise. For N = 33 and s = 1 (top left), the three lines of equal
payoffs defined by Eqs. (34) are parallel to the boundaries of
the simplex. Changing the population size to N = 11 (top
right) does not change these lines, but only the state space of
the system indicated by dots. For example, the system can
no longer access the center of the simplex. With decreasing
s, the three lines of equal payoffs are rotated clockwise (bot-
tom left, s = 0.5). With increasing s, these lines are rotated
counterclockwise (bottom right, s = 2.5). Only in special
cases, the three lines of equal payoffs defined by Eqs. (34)
intersect with the possible states of the system. The arrows
in the upper left figure indicate the direction of selection as
it is induced by the cyclic dominance of the three strategies.
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tions, the state space is only a subset of (N+1)(N+2)/2
states within the simplex S3, cf. FIG. 4. Moreover, the
dynamics is typically stochastic. Properties such as the
average drift for a Moran process or the average time
to reach the absorbing the boundaries are attainable for
weak selection [46, 49]. To analyze the strong selection
limit, we adopt the evolutionary process with selection at
birth and death discussed above for 2×2 games. Starting
with the payoffs from (23) in a well–mixed population the
average payoffs read
piR = iS − iP s, (24)
piP = iR − iS s, (25)
piS = iP − iR s, (26)
where iR, iP , and iS = N − iR − iP are the number of
individuals playing Rock, Paper, or Scissors in a popula-
tion of size N , respectively. Individuals are selected pro-
portional to fitness at birth and proportional to inverse
fitness at death, both with the intensity of selection β.
The fitness of strategy X is given by fX = exp[+β piX ].
The dynamics on the discrete finite set of states is gov-
erned by six transition probabilities in each state. The
transition probabilities in each state (iR, iP , iS) to change
to one of the six neighboring states are thus given by
TY→X(iR, iP , iS) =
iX fX∑
Z iZfZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
birth
× iY f
−1
Y∑
Z iZf
−1
Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
death
, (27)
where X, Y , and Z stand for R, P , or S. Note that
the probability to stay in the given state is given by
TR→R(iR, iP , iS) + TP→P (iR, iP , iS) + TS→S(iR, iP , iS).
For strong selection, β → ∞, the system moves from
each state into one direction with probability one unless
two payoffs are identical. In the following we address how
this direction depends on the payoffs in the state and on
the paprameter s.
Let us first assume that for given state (iR, iP , iS),
we have the unique ordering of the average payoffs from
(24)–(26). Let pi1 denote the largest and pi3 denote the
lowest value, i. e. pi1 > pi2 > pi3. The number of individ-
uals playing the according strategies can be denoted as
i1, i2, and i3. For T3→1, we have
T3→1 =
i1e
βpi1
i1eβpi1 + i2eβpi2 + i3eβpi3
× i3e
−βpi3
i1e−βpi1 + i2e−βpi2 + i3e−βpi3
(28)
=
i1
i1 + i2e−β(pi1−pi2) + i3e−β(pi1−pi3)
× i3
i1e−β(pi1−pi3) + i2e−β(pi2−pi3) + i3
, (29)
where pi1 − pi2 > 0, pi1 − pi3 > 0, as well as pi2 − pi3 > 0.
For β →∞, this leads to
lim
β→∞
T3→1 = 1. (30)
All the other transition probabilities vanish. In each re-
productive event, an individual with the largest payoff re-
places an individual with the smallest payoff. This holds
for any unique ordering of the three payoffs.
If the payoffs are not in unique order, that is, if two or
more payoffs are equal, at least two probabilities become
non–trivial. This yields the following three scenarios:
(i) For pi1 > pi2 = pi3, the individual with the highest
average payoff is certainly selected at birth. But se-
lection at death will remove an individual carrying
one of the two remaining strategies with probability
given by their abundance. We find
lim
β→∞
T2→1 =
i2
i2 + i3
, (31a)
and
lim
β→∞
T3→1 =
i3
i2 + i3
. (31b)
Obviously, we have T2→1 + T3→1 = 1.
(ii) For pi1 = pi2 > pi3, the individual with the lowest
payoff is selected for death with certainty, but se-
lection at birth is still probabilistic. It is easy to
see that
lim
β→∞
T3→1 =
i1
i1 + i2
, (32a)
and
lim
β→∞
T3→2 =
i2
i1 + i2
. (32b)
Thus, T3→1 + T3→2 = 1.
(iii) For pi1 = pi2 = pi3, selection is stochastic at birth
and at death. In this case, we find
lim
β→∞
TX→Y =
iX
N
iY
N
. (33)
As expected, we have
∑
X,Y TX→Y = 1.
These results are valid if two or more payoffs are equal at
a given lattice site, which is only obvious for s = 1 and
might not occur for any lattice site at all in the general
case of s 6= 1.
With (24)–(26), we can compute the point sets in the
simplex where two or all three average payoffs are equal,
depending on the value of s. For piR = piP = piS this is
only the center of the simplex, independent of s. For two
payoffs being equal, we obtain the three linear equations
piR = piS at iP (s+ 2) = N − iR(1− s),
piS = piP at iP (s− 1) = Ns− iR(1 + 2s), (34)
piR = piP at iP (2s+ 1) = N(1 + s)− iR(2 + s).
However, it is not obvious at which of the discrete states
(iR, iP , iS) we can observe equal average payoffs of two
strategies if the losers payoff is not equal to −1, and
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FIG. 5: The probability that the system fixates at the lower
left corner, e. g. φR, in a system with N = 33, and s = 1
for strong selection β → ∞, depending on the initial state
(iR, iP , iS). As discussed in the main text, fixation is stochas-
tic. Near the corners and along the edges fixation is deter-
ministic. In a central area of the simplex, the system spirals
out in a probabalistic fashion. The closer the initial condition
is to the center, the closer the probability to get absorbed in
a given state is to one third (fixation probabilities obtained
from numerical simulations over 104 realizations).
especially if the system size is not a multiple of three,
compare FIG. 4.
For simplicity we thus concentrate on the case of N
being a multiple of three. In general, the strong selec-
tion behavior of the system is determined by the transi-
tion probabilities near the lines of equal average payoffs.
When the population size N is a multiple of three, the
dynamics for the three different cases of s = 1, s < 1, or
s > 1, is as follows:
For s = 1, we have piR = piS at iP = N/3, piS = piP
at iR = N/3, and piR = piP at iS = N/3. Hence, there
is always stochastic movement induced by Eqs. (31) and
(32) as well as (33). Apart from these points, the di-
rection of selection is indeed deterministic, which means
that an individual with higher payoff always replaces an
individual with a lower one. In certain regimes, near
the corners of the simplex and along the edges the initial
condition determines the final state where the system fix-
ates. In a much larger area, however, the system fixates
stochastically. In FIG. 5 we illustrate this by showing
one fixation probability obtained from numerical simula-
tions of the birth–death process. Due to the symmetry
of the system, this fixation probability can be either φR,
φP , or φS .
For s < 1, the lines where payoffs are equal rotate
clockwise in our setup of cyclic dominance. In general,
no states of the finite population system coincide with
the lines of equal payoffs (except for special cases), see
FIG. 4. But as soon as the process crosses these lines,
it changes direction. Near the corners and on the edges
the system fixates deterministically, but in a central area
the process spirals inwards if it does not hit the bound-
ary of the system. However, it turns out that there is
a largest limit cycle (LLC) depending on s and N and
that there can be several other limit cycles (OLC) inside
the LLC. We demonstrate this finding as it is obtained
from numerical simulations in FIG. 6, showing one sam-
ple trajectory that ends as the LLC. Note that the term
cycle actually refers to a hexagon.
FIG. 6: For a population size of N = 33 and s = 0.5, the dy-
namics is such, that fixation does not occur in a central area,
buy it is deterministic near the corners. For instance, any ini-
tial condition in the dark blue area will lead to the pure state
at the lower left. The white area marks the sites from which,
chosen as initial condition, the system does not fixate, but ap-
proaches a closed cycle. We show an example trajectory of the
system that ends on the largest of these cycles (red hexagon)
starting from the initial state (iR, iP , iS) = (1, 9, 23). Inside
this largest cycle, there are other cycles such that every site
except the center is already on such a cycle.
For s > 1, as the lines of equal payoffs rotate counter
clockwise (FIG. 4) the system spirals outwards in a de-
terministic fashion. The movement is no longer deter-
ministic only near the corners and along the edges but
everywhere (except for the center), compare FIG. 7. This
means that if the modulus of the payoff for losing in our
cyclic game, s, is larger than the payoff for winning, 1,
we observe strictly deterministic fixation depending on
the initial condition.
In this section, we have shown that a birth–death pro-
cess with exponential payoff to fitness mapping and se-
lection at birth and death is able to induce determinis-
tic movement in the strong selection limit even in 3 × 3
games. For the transition probabilities TY→X this limit
can be performed analytically. It turns out that the mi-
croscopic dynamics is dependent only on the hierarchy of
the average payoffs. As for finite systems an analytic
description of the fixation probabilities (and times) is
lacking, further examination of this system has to be nu-
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merical. Under strong selection the patterns that emerge
show a very interesting regularity; it turns out that apart
from system size, the results are dependent on the param-
eter s.
s = 1.1
s = 2.5 s = 5
s = 1.7
FIG. 7: Deterministic fixation for a population of size N = 33
and different s > 1. The dynamics is deterministic every-
where, except in the center (white dot), where all three pay-
offs are the same. Depending on the initial state, the system
fixates to a given pure state. This is indicated by the three
different colors at each state. For instance, when the system
is initially at a site in dark blue, the system will fixate to the
pure state at the lower left with probability one. We show
one example trajectory (orange arrow) starting from the ini-
tial state (iR, iP , iS) = (10, 13, 10). By increasing s, we can
vary the state that is ultimately reached by the system.
VI. DISCUSSION
The standard approaches to evolutionary game dy-
namics such as the Moran process or pairwise compar-
ison based on the Fermi rule lead to stochastic dynamics
in finite populations [12]. Even if the direction of se-
lection becomes deterministic, the time scale typically
remains stochastic and leads to a distribution of the av-
erage fixation or mean exit times [29]. Moreover, these
standard approaches do not lead to a deterministic direc-
tion of selection in games with more than two different
strategies [51]. Here, we have introduced a process with
selection at birth and at death. This process allows to
interpolate between weak selection, usually considered in
evolutionary biology, and arbitrary strong selection, such
that in the extreme case the worst performing individ-
ual is always replaced by a copy of the best performing
individual. This kind of selection is sometimes used in
evolutionary optimization [36, 52]. While the limiting
case itself may not be of most interest for real biological
or social systems, which are always subject to stochastic
noise, we discussed the most important features of this
limit. In particular, it reveals speed limits of evolution-
ary dynamics in 2 × 2 games that stochastic dynamics
cannot cross and shows that in games with more than
two strategies, the limiting deterministic dynamics can
have a crucial dependence on the initial conditions.
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